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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
D E N N I S R. COBURN, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
GIVAN FORD SALES, INC. 
Defendant and Appellant, 
and 





S T A T E M E N T OF T H E N A T U R E OF 
T H E CASE 
This is an action for personal injuries and property 
damages arising out of a traffic accident in Provo, Utah, 
in which Respondent, Dennis R. Coburn, claimed the 
negligence of defendant, Craig D. Kempton, was the 
cause of his injuries and that Appellant, Givan Ford 
1 
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Sales, Inc., was also liable therefor for the reason that 
Kempton was their employee, was driving a vehicle 
owned by them and was acting in the scope of his em-
ployment at the time of the accident. 
DISPOSITION IN T H E L O W E R COURT 
The case was tried to a jury before the Honorable 
Allen B. Sorensen in the District Court in and for Utah 
County, resulting in a unanimous jury verdict and con-
sequent judgment for special damages, general damages 
and costs, totaling $22,340.22. Judgment was entered 
against both Craig D. Kempton and Givan Ford Sales, 
Inc., in that amount. After the trial, Appellant, Givan 
Ford Sales, Inc., made motions for dismissal, for judg-
ment notwithstanding the verdict and for a new trial, 
which were denied, and now Givan appeals. 
R E L I E F S O U G H T ON A P P E A L 
Respondent requests that the jury verdict and judg-
ment entered thereon be affirmed. 
S T A T E M E N T OF FACTS 
Respondent controverts and supplements Appel-
lant's Statement of Facts as follows: 
On December 4, 1970, Respondent, Dennis R. 
Coburn, a young married man and recent college gradu-
ate, was making business calls on his new job as an 
2 
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insurance agent for Farm Bureau Insurance Company. 
He was traveling north on University Avenue in Provo 
in his Volkswagen automobile crossing a viaduct which 
carried the traffic over the railroad tracks. The weather 
was rainy and cold, and as he approached the inter-
section at the bottom of the viaduct a green Alpine 
Sunbeam sports car made a sudden "jack rabbit" start 
from a side road which entered the intersection from 
his right. Plaintiff was driving on a through street and 
the sports car came out from a stop sign, failing to yield 
the right-of-way. The sports car executed a left turn 
resulting in almost a head-on collision between the two 
vehicles. The driver of th Sunbeam Alpine sports car 
had been having difficulty with the defrosting mecha-
nism and his windows were entirely fogged except for 
a small hole in the windshield which the driver had 
cleared with his hand. The sports car was owned by 
Givan Ford Sales, Inc., and driven by their employee, 
Craig D. Kempton, who stated that he did not see the 
Volkswagen automobile as he entered the intersection 
just before impact. 
Craig D. Kempton had worked for Givan Ford 
Sales, Inc., for about six months prior to the time of 
the accident (Tr. 43). He punched a time clock each 
day, working from 8:00 o'clock a.m. to 6:00 p.m., with 
a usual work week of 44 hours (Tr. 44). Mr. Kempton 
worked under the Sales Department, having been hired 
by Ernie Earl, Givan Ford Sales Manager, who was 
his immediate supervisor (Tr. 44, 45 and 116). He was 
also subject to supervision in his work to another sales-
3 
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man, Mr. Denny Davis, and the owners, Mr. Larry 
Givan and Mr. Ed Givan (Tr. 216). Givan Ford Sales, 
Inc., maintained a large lot of new and used cars which 
occupied a large portion of a city block in Provo, front-
ing on both University Avenue and Second South 
Street (Tr. 107). Craig Kempton's duties related to 
the new as well as the used cars, including starting all 
used cars every morning and all new cars every other 
morning and seeing that all cars physically ran (Tr. 
45 ,46). I t was his responsibility to keep the cars clean, 
washed, vacuumed, and oil levels filled up. He had to 
check and charge batteries, see to the repair and main-
tenance of tires by delivering them to a nearby service 
station where the work would be done; and since it was 
wintertime, he had a daily responsibility to install anti-
freeze in all cars whose antifreeze levels were insuffi-
cient for the weather conditions (Tr. 45, 47 and 49). 
I t was his general responsibility to see that all cars were 
kept in sales condition and make sure they were "run-
ning pretty good." If any car would not start or had 
a condition that needed repair that he could not handle 
himself, he was to report it to Ernie Earl or get a 
mechanic to have it repaired (Tr. 35, 48, 49, 106, 130 
and 213). 
Appellant had provided Mr. Kempton with his 
own personal dealer's plate which he could place on 
any of the new or used cars when he took them off the 
lot (Tr. 47). He took cars from the lot and used the 
plate on a daily basis (Tr. 48). His daily duties required 
him to run frequent errands in the community to get 
4 
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parts or other items for the company, and in doing so 
he would always take one of the used cars from the lot 
(Tr. 47 and 131). Because the car lot of Givan Ford 
Sales, Inc. fronted on two streets and because Mr. 
Kempton's duties required him to do so, he was always 
moving cars somewhere, rearranging their location from 
one part of the lot to the other, going on errands, and 
otherwise driving cars on and off the lot (Tr. 107, 108 
and 109). 
Occasionally he was instructed to drive vehicles on 
errands to Salt Lake City, Ogden and American Fork 
(Tr. 109). Once in awhile Ernie Earl would instruct 
him to take a specific used car because it hadn't been 
out on the street for awhile in order to" loosen it up" 
(Tf. 47). 
There was a regular practice at Given Ford Sales, 
Inc., for the salesmen to offer to pay Craig a "bird 
dog" fee for any referrals he made of people who bought 
a specific car. Although the company did not pay the 
bird dog fees, the practice was common knowledge in 
the company and had the company's tacit approval 
(Tr. 105, 106, 107, 230, 231 and 232). Craig had two 
or three friends who had come onto the lot and talked 
to him prior to the accident about looking for a car 
that might be used as a dune buggy. As he drove the 
cars about, he was often looking them over to see if he 
might be able to find a prospective buyer among his 
acquaintances (Tr. 135 and 136). 
Since it was winter, Mr. Kempton had a daily duty 
5 
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to check the antifreeze in the cars. This was particularly 
true with regard to used cars which were newly arrived 
on the lot, which would occur several times a day (Tr. 
49). If antifreeze was needed, he would pull the car 
off the lot into the street to drain the radiator into the 
gutter and then he would place the antifreeze in the 
cooling system. Craig usually pulled the car to be tested 
off the lot, would drive it for a couple of blocks, and 
then return back to the street, parking near the lot to 
perform these services (Tr. 49, 107 and 132). Givan 
Ford Sales, Inc., supplied Mr. Kempton with two 
different antifreeze testers, one that required the engine 
coolant to be warm when tested. When using that tester, 
he would usually run the motor of the car until it was 
warm and then run his test (Tr. 140). 
On the day of the accident Mr. Kempton punched 
in on the time clock at 7:58 o'clock a.m. (Tr. 143). H e 
performed his usual duties that morning with regard to 
starting and washing cars until a little after 11:00 o'clock 
a.m. The Sunbeam Alpine, which he was driving at 
the time of the accident, had newly arrived on the lot, 
and he had not yet checked the antifreeze in it. His 
intention was to take it off the lot, warm it up and return 
to test the antifreeze (Tr. 125). As he drove it off the 
lot, he testified that he decided to also try it out in order 
that he could tell the salesmen of its running condition. 
H e thought he might have some friends who might be 
interested in buying it, and he thought he might look 
at it himself to see if he might be interested in buying 
it to be a dune buggy (Tr. 125, 136). H e drove the 
6 
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car three blocks to the intersection where the accident 
occurred at about 11:20 o'clock a.m. After the accident, 
he was so badly shaken up that he was told by his super-
visor, Ernie Eari, that he ought to go home early and 
he checked off his time card when he left work at 12:15 
o'clock p.m. (Tr. 137 and 144). He resumed his regular 
work schedule the next day (Tr. 138). 
Mr. Coburn sustained permanent injuries consist-
ing of a scalping and facial laceration from the hairline 
across the forehead, through the eyebrow, and across 
the eyelid, a bone chip in the elbow, and a severe frac-
ture of the talus bone in the left ankle, which perma-
nently limited the motion and use of the ankle that 
resulted in a lifetime of pain and a limp while walk-
ing. The medical experts estimated his loss of total 
body function of from 7.5 percent to 15 percent. 
A R G U M E N T 
P O I N T I 
A P P E L L A N T S L I A B I L I T Y W A S S H O W N 
BY S U B S T A N T I A L C O M P E T E N T EVI -
D E N C E TO W H I C H A P P E L L A N T M A D E NO 
OBJECTION, A N D NO E R R O R W A S COM-
M I T T E D I N D E N Y I N G A P P E L L A N T S OB-
J E C T I O N S TO T H E O T H E R E V I D E N C E ON 
L I A B I L I T Y . 
Appellant's assertion that the cconly" evidence of 
liability on the part of Givan Ford Sales, Inc., was 
7 
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incompetent and improperly admitted is not only erro-
neous, it flies in the face of the record. In making this 
assertion, Appellant seems to be stating what he wishes 
were true while choosing to neatly ignore the facts 
that were put into evidence. Appellant says, in effect, 
that had the trial court sustained Appellant's objec-
tions to certain evidence, the jury would have had no 
evidence from which it could determine that Craig 
Kempton was acting within the scope or course of his 
employment at the time of the accident. 
While it is true that in the course of the trial 
counsel for Givan Ford made several objections to the 
introduction of some of the evidence, it is assuredly 
not true that the "only" evidence of liability of Givan 
Ford was introduced over counsel's objections. A 
review of the whole record will clearly demonstrate that 
the jury had before it adequate, substantial and con-
vincing evidence of the liability of Givan Ford other 
than that which was challenged by objections of Givan 
Ford's counsel. 
The following summary describes some of the evi-
dence that was introduced without challenge as to com-
petency or propriety of its admission, and amply illus-
trates the error of Appellant's assertion: 
l.At the time of the accident, Craig Kempton 
had worked for Givan Ford for about six months 
(Tr. 43). 
2. H e worked about 44 hours a week, usually 
from 8:00 o'clock a.m. to 6:00 o'clock p.m., 
and punched a time clock each day (Tr. 44). 
8 
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On the day of the accident he punched in at 
7:58 a.m., and signed out about an hour after 
the accident (Tr. 143). 
3. He was hired by Ernie Earl, Givan Ford's 
Sales Manager, who became his immediate su-
pervisor, and he worked under the Sales Depart-
ment (Tr. 44, 45 and 116). H e was also subject 
to supervision by the owners, Larry Givan and 
Ed Givan, and Denny Davis, a salesman (Tr. 
216). 
4. Givan Ford maintained a large lot of new 
and used cars. Craig Kempton's duties included: 
keeping them clean, washed, vacuumed, oil levels 
up, checking batteries and tires, checking and 
installing antifreeze, starting all used cars every 
morning and all new cars every other morning, 
and seeing that all cars physically ran. If they 
would not start, he was to report it to Ernie 
Earl or get a mechanic to have them repaired. 
He was generally to see that the cars were kept 
in sales condition (Tr. 45, 48, 49, 106, 130 and 
215). 
5. His daily duties required him to run frequent 
errands in the community to get parts or other 
items for the company, and in doing so he would 
always take one of the used cars from the lot 
(Tr. 47 and 131). 
6. Givan Ford provided Mr. Kempton with his 
own personal dealer's plate which he could place 
on any of the new or used cars when he took 
them off the lot (Tr. 47). He took cars from 
the lot and used the plates daily (Tr. 48). Some-
times he took cars without using the dealer's 
plate if he wasn't going far (Tr. 48). 
7. The car lot fronted on two streets and Craig 
was always moving cars somewhere, rearrang-
9 
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ing their location from one part of the lot to the 
other or going on errands (Tr. 107,108 and 109). 
8. Occasionally he was sent on errands to Salt 
Lake City, Ogden and American Fork (Tr. 
109). 
9. Sometimes Ernie Earl would tell him to take 
a specific used car to loosen it up because it hadn't 
been out on the street for awhile (Tr. 47). 
10. When a tire was flat, he would take the car a 
block away to Rowley's Texaco to have it re-
paired (Tr. 47). 
11. There was a regular practice of Givan Ford 
for their salesmen to offer to pay a "bird dog" 
fee to Craig for referrals of people who bought 
cars. This practice was common knowledge to 
the company and to Ernie Earl, Craig's super-
visor (Tr. 105, 106, 107, 230, 231 and 232). 
12. Craig had two or three friends who had come 
onto the lot and talked to him prior to the acci-
dent about looking for a car they might use to 
make a dune buggy. One approached him right 
after the accident in relation to seeing if he could 
buy the car involved in the accident for that pur-
pose (Tr. 135 and 136). 
13. It was winter, and as used cars were brought 
to the lot it was Craig's duty to check the anti-
freeze. This occurred several times a day. If 
anitfreeze was needed, he would pull the car off 
the lot into the street to drain the radiator and 
put antifreeze in it. Craig would usually pull 
the car to be tested off the lot, drive a couple of 
blocks, make a U-turn and go back to the lot 
(Tr. 49, 107 and 132). 
14. Givan Ford supplied Craig with two differ-
ent antifreeze testers. One required the engine 
coolant to be warm when tested, and the other 
could test while cold. When he used the tester 
10 
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that required it to be warm, he would run the 
motor or else run the car until it was warm and 
then run the test (Tr. 140). 
15. The Sunbeam Alpine Craig was driving at 
the time of the accident had just previously 
arrived on the lot and Craig had not checked the 
antifreeze in it. H e drove it off the lot to run it 
before putting antifreeze in it. He also wanted 
to see how it ran. H e intended to drive the car 
to the viaduct three blocks away, cross the via-
duct, turn around and come back. H e drove 
it the three blocks to the intersection at the base 
of the viaduct where the accident occurred (Tr. 
125, 133, 134 and 140). 
16. The accident occurred at about 11:20 a.m. 
When he finished with the police officer he went 
back to Givan Ford where Ernie Earl told him 
he ought to go home early because he looked 
shaken up. He then wrote the time, 12:15 p.m. 
on his time card and left work. He resumed his 
regular work schedule on the next day (Tr. 
28, 29, 137, 139, 143 and 144). 
Surely the foregoing evidence that came in without 
objection amply demonstrates that the evidence that 
Appellant objected to was not the "only" evidence on 
the liability of Givan Ford. 
Appellant next insists that the evidence at the 
trail established that Craig Kempton was doing nothing 
in furtherance of Givan Ford's business nor anything 
reasonably incidental to his employment, and that there-
fore Givan Ford should be free from liability. The 
record flatly contradicts such an assertion. In fact, 
the record makes it clear that Mr. Kempton had at least 
four purposes in driving the car that day: 
11 
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1. His primary purpose was to take it off the 
lot and warm up the engine in order to test the 
antifreeze. 
2. In addition, he said he wanted to drive it in 
order to be able to answer the inquiries he ex-
pected from salesmen on how it ran. 
3. He wanted to be able to check it over and see 
if he thought one of his friends might want it 
so he could get a "bird dog" fee from the sale. 
4. He further wanted to see if he might be in-
terested in buying the car himself for a dune 
buggy. 
Clearly, all four purposes for the trip were in further-
ance of the employer's business. Givan had the car for 
sale and all four reasons for the trip related to its po-
tential sale. Mr. Kempton was employed as part of 
the staff of Givan Ford's Sales Department. He was 
furnished with his own dealer s plates. His direct super-
visor was the Sales Manager, Mr. Ernie Earl, who 
testified one of Mr. Kempton's duties was to check the 
cars to be sure they were in sales condition. Warming 
up the engine to test the antifreeze was one of his 
specific and direct duties. I t was winter, the car had 
just come onto the lot and he needed to get that done. 
He considered it to be part of his job to run the car 
not only so he could do his work on it, but so he could 
tell his supervisor or a mechanic if it needed work to 
put it in sales condition, and also so he could tell the 
salesmen about its condition. His driving only three 
blocks to the intersection where the accident occurred 
was consistent with his usual practice of driving a few 
blocks before checking the antifreeze, and was clearly 
in the scope of his employment. 
12 
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Checking the car to see if he might have a friend 
who might want to buy it is clearly in furtherance of the 
employer's purposes, and so, likewise, was checking it 
to see if he may want to buy it. He said he had already 
bought one car off the lot. Neither of these additional 
purposes cancelled or terminated his primary purpose 
of getting the engine warm so he could check the anti-
freeze. 
Appellant seems to insist that since Craig Kempton 
may have had a personal reason for the trip as well as 
furtherance of his employer's business, this, ipso facto, 
takes him out of the scope of employment. Such is 
clearly not the law. 
I t is well settled that when the employee is com-
bining his own business with that of his employer he 
is within the scope of his employment. The American 
Law Institute Restatement of the Law, Agency 2d, 
Section 236, Conduct Actuated by Dual Purpose, 
states this rule as follows: 
" Conduct may be within the scope of employ-
ment, although done in part to serve the purpose 
of the servant or of a third person." 
Fuller v. Chambers, 377 P . 2d 848, Calif. 1959, states 
at page 852: 
" . . . where the servant is combining his own 
business with that of his master, or attending 
to both at substantially the same time, no nice 
inquiry will be made as to which business the 
servant was actually engaged in when a third 
person was injured; but the master will be held 
13 
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responsible, unless it clearly appears that the 
servant could not have been directly or indirectly 
serving his master." 
See also, Van Vranken v. Fence-Craft, 430 P . 2d 488, 
Idaho, 1967. I t was stated in Carter v. Bessey, 97 Utah 
427, 93 P. 2d 490: 
"Whenever reasonable minds may differ as to 
whether the servant was at a certain time in-
volved wholly or partly in the performance of his 
master's business, or within the scope of his 
employment, the question is one for a jury." 
(page 432) 
and further: 
"The question in every case is whether the act 
he was doing was one in prosecution of his mas-
ter's business and not whether it was done in 
accordance with the master's instructions." (page 
433) 
Furthermore, it is clear that slight deviation from 
instructions of the master for the employee's own 
purposes does not take the servant out of the scope of 
his employment. The case of Burton v. LaDuke, 61 
Utah 78, 210 P . 978, involved such a question and this 
court stated: 
" . . . there was some substantial evidence in the 
record not only tending to show that the defend-
ant, had with knowledge, not only sent out 
his employee, Pedigrew, upon the streets to 
do his work with an auto truck dangerous-
ly defective in operation, but also tending 
to show that as has been seen, defendant 
had, at least on one previous occasion in the 
furtherance of his cleaning business, sent 
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Pedigrew far beyond the district in which it was 
claimed his duties were to be performed. That 
being true, it was for the jury, under proper 
instruction given by the court, to find as a fact 
from all the evidence, and not for the court to 
determine as a matter of law, whether or not the 
defendant's servant had exceeded his authority, 
and was not acting within the scope of his em-
ployment nor in the furtherance of his master's 
business at the time when and the place where 
the accident complained of occurred." (page 83) 
After citing numerous cases in support of the 
proposition that mere deviation from his duty by an 
employee does not exempt his employer from liability 
for his negligence in the event of accident, the court 
further stated: 
"We have tried to show that, ordinarily, in cases 
of this kind, the question of whether or not the 
wrong complained fo was committed within 
the scope of the servant's employment is one 
primarily to be determined by the jury from 
the evidence in the particular case, more espe-
cially where there is doubt or conflicting evidence 
as to the authority conferred upon the servant 
byt he master and the scope of his employment." 
(pages 85 and 86) 
The basic thrust of Point I of Appellant's brief 
directs itself to a claim that it was error for the trial 
court to allow use of the deposition of Craig Kempton 
at the trial. Appellant avers that Craig Kempton was 
not really adverse to plaintiff on the issue of the scope 
of his employment, and therefore the answers he gave at 
his deposition could not properly be used for any pur-
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pose at the trial. Appellant appears to hope that because 
this court has available to it only the cold words of the 
record, it may not discern that Mr. Kempton was not 
only an adverse party to plaintiff in the proceeding, 
but he was uncooperative and clearly a hostile witness 
as the Respondent's council examined him and sought 
to impeach him by reference to his answers given at 
the deposition that contradicted some of his testimony 
at the trial. Though in a situation such as the instant 
one, the Respondent's tendency is to wish the court had 
available to it a sound track movie of the trial from 
which to view Mr. Kempton's hostile demeanor and 
attitude, this court has often observed that it gives 
deference to the advantaged position of the trial judge 
in that regard. Nevertheless, a review of the record 
will give some insight as to the circumstances in this 
case. 
Respondent specifically called Craig Kempton to 
testify as an "adverse witness" without objection by 
appellant (Tr. 42 and 118), As Mr. Kempton answered 
Respondent's questions, he was often evasive and 
ducked his head, mumbling uncooperative and almost 
inaudible answers. He had to be repeatedly cautioned 
to speak up (Tr. 43 and 46). As counsel for Respond-
ent observed in discussion with the trial court, Mr. 
Kempton clearly demonstrated by his courtroom de-
meanor that he considered himself to be adverse and 
hostile to the Respondent (Tr. 118). The trial court 
even specifically ruled that he was a "hostile" witness 
(Tr. 126). 
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An examination of the record will show that as 
counsel for Respondent was asking Mr. Kempton to 
describe his duties with relation to the used cars, Ap-
pellant was making objections designed to prevent 
Mr. Kempton from testifying that one of his responsi-
bilities was to check the cars in order to keep them 
running well. Counsel for Appellant first tried to 
interpose an objection in such a way as to tell the 
witness he did not want him to say it was his job to 
keep the cars running: 
"Q. MR. J E F F S : Now you had some respon-
sibility then to keep them running, is that it? 
A. Yes. 
MR. C L E G G : I am going to object to that. I 
believe he testified he was to start them, but not 
keep them running. That is a mechanic's job. 
T H E COURT: You can cross-examine him and 
develop that, can't you? 
MR. C L E G G : Perhaps I can, your Honor. I 
think we are going . . . " (Tr. 45, lines 15 to 24) 
He next objected that counsel for Respondent should 
not be allowed to lead this adverse witness on questions 
relating to scope of his employment (Tr. 45, 46 and 
49). Finally he sought and received permission from 
the court to Voir Dire the witness on that question 
(Tr. 50). The consequences of Mr. Kempton's answers 
to Appellant's questions in that Voir Dire examina-
tion was to give the jury the impression that it was 
not one of Mr. Kempton's duties to see that the cars 
were running. This was in direct conflict with testi-
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mony he had previously given in his deposition. The 
situation was ripe for impeachment. Counsel for Re-
spondent, after Appellant's Voir Dire examination, 
asked Mr. Kempton if he had not testified in his depo-
sition that it was his responsibility to see if the cars 
were in good running condition and report whether 
they were or not (Tr. 15, line 10). I t is interesting to 
note it was then counsel for Appellant who first re-
quested, "Could we have the deposition?" (Tr. 51, line 
15), even though, now, on appeal he complains that it 
was error to allow the use of the deposition. In any event, 
the deposition was published without objection from 
Appellant, and the following colloquy took place: 
"Q. MR. J E F F S : Now if you will follow me on 
page 31, I asked you which salesman asked 
you about the condition of the specific cars on 
the lot, and you answered: 'All of them would. 
If I was around there they would yell, 'What 
kind of shape is this car in?' I would say, you 
know, I would tell them pretty well. Dennie 
liked to know just exactly. He didn't like to 
take the customer. He would say, 'Does this car 
run good? Does it eat oil or do this?' and I would 
tell him.' 
Q. Now, was that your answer at that time? 
A. Close enough, yes. 
Q. Now . . . 
T H E COURT: Mr. Jeffs, I believe the Bailiff 
left a note for you. 
MR. J E F F S : Your honor, I have had a message 
that Doctor Robertson is here, and pursuant to 
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the stipulation that we entered into, I would 
therefore request we interrupt the testimony of 
this witness and resume it after we have Doctor 
Robertson testify. 
T H E COURT: Step down." 
The use of the deposition for impeachment was 
thus interrupted before its completion as Mr. Kempton 
left the stand. After several hours of medical testimony 
by two doctors was completed, Mr. Kempton again 
resumed the stand and testified about his activities in 
connection with his work (Tr. 104 to 116). The depo-
sition was not used in connection with that testimony. 
Then, as the examination returned to the issue of his 
duties, raised earlier by Appellant's Voir Dire exami-
nation, the testimony was again interrupted when 
counsel for Respondent asked: 
"Q. Okay. Now with regard to the other use of 
the cars, with regard to their working condition, 
the use of the cars I take it then that you made 
was also to find out how they were running, is 
that right? 
MR. C L E G G : Objection." (Tr. 109 and 110) 
A harangue between counsel ensued that continued 
until time for the court to recess for the day (Tr. 110 
to 115). 
The following day Mr. Kempton resumed the 
stand and counsel for Respondent resumed the use of 
the deposition and impeachment process that had begun 
before the interruptions of the day before (Tr. 116). 
Council for Appellant objected that it appeared to be 
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an attempt at impeachment when to his view the wit-
ness was not in a position for impeachment. Giving 
counsel for Appellant the benefit of the doubt, he had 
apparently forgotten that the use of the deposition 
for impeachment of the previous day had been inter-
rupted and did not recognize this as a resumption of 
that questioning process (Tr. 117). After another 
extended debate between counsel on the question of the 
use of the deposition, the court allowed Respondent's 
counsel to read to the witness two more of his answers 
from the deposition in which he had stated it was his 
duty to keep the cars running and to ask if he had not 
in fact made those statements. 
Not only does Appellant erroneously assert that 
the deposition was not used for impeachment, but he 
would have this court believe that counsel for Respond-
ent had been unable to adduce direct testimony that 
Mr. Kempton was acting in the scope of his employ-
ment and so he resorted to reading into the record 
extensively from Mr. Kempton's deposition to super-
impose it on the direct testimony. Such an assertion 
is simply not true. 
We have already set forth herein some of that direct 
testimony Appellant hopes to ignore, but even more, 
the record shows the total use of the deposition was as 
follows: (Tr. 52, line 29 to 53, line 10) 
"Q. MR. J E F F S : Now if you will follow me 
on page 31, I asked you which salesman asked 
you about the condition of the specific cars on 
the lot, and you answered 'All of them would. If 
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I was around there they would say, they would 
have a customer and they would yell, 'What 
kind of shape is this car in?' I would say, you 
know, i would tell them pretty well. Dennie liked 
to know just exactly. He didn't like to take 
the customer. He would say, 'Does this car run 
good? Does it eat oil or do this?' And I would 
tell him.' 
Q. Now was that your answer at that time? 
A. Close enough, yes." 
Tr. 122, line 22 to 123, line 6: 
"Q. MR. J E F F S : Now, Mr. Kempton, we 
were talking about what Ernie Earl told you 
your responsibilities were, and in your deposi-
tion you said: 'All he told me was that I was 
supposed to keep the cars running pretty good 
and then he just gave me a few things to do. 
H e said, 'We will keep you busy. You come 
and ask me what to do, and I will keep you go-
ing for a few days, and from then on you are 
on your own.' He said, 'You will know what 
to do by then.' " 
Now that was your statement, was it not? 
A. Yes, it was. 
Q. Okay. Then I asked you to describe for me 
what your duties were during the course of your 
employment, and if you will go to page 4, please, 
on line 9, you answered: 'Well, all I was—' " 
Counsel for Appellant interrupted with an objec-
tion and after the court ruled, the questioned continued 
(Tr. 123, line 17 to 29): 
"Q. MR. J E F F S : You answered, Mr. Kemp-
ton : 'Well, all I was ever told was to keep cars 
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washed and cleaned and make sure all of them 
were running good, and check the antifreeze and 
the oil, and just general keeping them in sales 
condition.' 
T H E COURT: Hasn't he already said that 
yesterday, Mr. Jeffs? 
MR. J E F F S : If he did, I apologize, Your 
Honor. 
T H E COURT : Go ahead. Ask the question. 
Q. MR. J E F F S : That's what you were to do in 
connection with your work, is that right? 
A. That is right." 
Therefore, as the foregoing review of the record 
illustrates, although there were several protracted argu-
ments to the court relative to use of the deposition 
(most of which took place out of the hearing of the 
jury) , the actual use of the deposition before the jury 
was limited to reading three brief answers of the witness 
and to query him as to their truthfulness. All three 
contradicted the statements he had made during Appel-
lant's Voir Dire examination to the effect that he had 
no duties to check the cars to keep them running. 
Appellant's brief seeks to dispose of the facts 
disclosed in the record by the mere statement that "the 
questions were not cast to impeach," choosing to ignore 
the fact that the deposition really was used for impeach-
ment. Counsel for Respondent so stated at the time 
it was done (Tr. 119) and in fact it was used to show 
that the three answers the witness gave in his deposition 
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contradicted the witnesses's testimony given during 
counsel for Appellant's Voir Dire examination. 
Rule 32 (a) (1) of the Utah Rules of Civil Proce-
dure provides as follows: 
"(1) Any deposition may be used by any party 
for the purpose of contradicting or impeaching 
the testimony of deponent as a witness . . . " 
And, Rule 43(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
provides as follows: 
"(b) Scope of Examination cmd Cross-Eocami-
nation. A party may interrogate any unwilling 
or hostile witness by leading questions. A party 
may call an adverse party . . . and interrogate 
him by leading questions without being bound 
by his testimony and may contradict and im-
peach him in all respects as if he had been called 
by the adverse party . . . " 
But even if the deposition had not been used for 
impeachment, Rule 32 (a) (2), Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure would apply. I t reads as follows: 
"The deposition of a party . . . may be used by 
an adverse party for any purpose." 
Appellant insists this court must construe the 
latter Rule so as to limit its application to parties ad-
verse on the issue developed. Appellant insists that Mr. 
Kempton was not adverse to plaintiff on the question 
of liability of his employer, Givan Ford, and therefore, 
the trial court should not have allowed any of the depo-
sition to be read. Appellant's reasoning in that regard 
seems rather elusive since the facts at trial demonstrate 
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that Mr. Kempton was clearly the adversary against 
whom plaintiff was seeking and did receive a judg-
ment on each of the issues alleged in the complaint, and 
since the employer's liability would necessarily be 
derivative arising only out of a finding of liability on 
the part of Mr. Kempton. In the court's instruction 
No. 12, the jury was specifically directed that if they 
did not find Craig Kempton to be liable to plaintiff, 
it would be unnecessary for them to consider the issue 
of his agency for Givan Ford, since Given Ford would 
not be liable. The suggestion that the interest of Mr. 
Kempton on the issue of the liability of his employer 
somehow crosses over in the lawsuit and becomes the 
same as the interest of the plaintiff is tantamount to 
saying that Mr. Kempton would somehow benefit from 
helping plaintiff prove the liability of his employer. 
Of course this is not true. Mr. Kempton could not be 
relieved from liability or in fact be benefitted in any 
way by helping plaintiff prove the liability of Givan 
Ford. His demeanor in the course of the trial, including 
uncooperative answers to the questions posed by Re-
spondent's counsel and his hostile manner amply demon-
strate the error of appellant's position as related to 
this defendant. 
Even if the record did not demonstrate Appellant's 
error on this point, careful examination of the authorities 
cited by Appellant in support of his theory will do so. 
Appellant cites as authority for that proposition, 
a comment relating to Rule 32(a), Federal Rules of 
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Civil Procedure, found in Volume IV A, Moore, Fed-
eral Practice (2d E d ) , 32-16 and 32-17, which reads 
as follows: 
" . . . The deposition of a party may be used 
for any purpose only by an adverse party; and 
the deposition of a party may not be used by 
anyone other than an adverse party for any pur-
pose except impeachment of the testimony of 
the deponent as a witness as provided in Rule 
32(a) (1), unless the court finds the existence 
of one of the conditions enumerated in Rule 32 
(a) (3) . 'Adverse party' as used in this Rule 
is a term of art, and means a party whose interest 
in the case is adverse to that of another party, 
even though they may be both nominally aligned 
as co-parties. Thus, where a defendant has served 
an answer upon a co-defendant which states a 
cross-claim against him, they are adverse parties 
as to the cross-claim, even though nominally they 
are co-defendants." 
Appellant's brief conveniently leaves out that 
explanatory last sentence. Nevertheless, even a very 
strained construction of the language quoted by Appel-
lant could not result in the conclusion that where a 
plaintiff is seeking a judgment against a defendant, 
that defendant's interest could somehow cross over in 
the lawsuit and become synonymous with that of the 
plaintiff so as to prevent use of his deposition at trial. 
I t seems obvious that the author's intention is to say 
that as to co-parties (that is those nominally named 
on the same side of the lawsuit) there should be a 
determination of adverse interest before such a party's 
deposition could be used by the other co-party under 
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Rule 32(a)(2) . Furthermore, if Appellant's reason-
ing were followed, the burden of the trial judge would 
be greatly increased by placing upon him the respon-
sibility of determining in the course of the trial, the 
shades or degrees of interest a party may have as to 
every issue and every party in the lawsuit. 
Appellant cites several cases as authority for his 
claim that the trial court should have determined that 
Craig Kempton was not adverse to plaintiff on the 
issue of the scope of his employment and should have 
refused to allow any questions from his deposition re-
lating to that issue. Appellant's brief quotes language 
from Skornia v. Highway Pavers, Inc., 34 Wis. 2d 160; 
148 N.W. 2d 678, which he urges supports that thesis. 
The Skornia case in no way espouses the rule that 
Appellant urges this court to adopt. In that case, 
Skornia, a highway workman employee of a subcon-
tractor, sued Allan Axt, a crane operator employee of 
the general contractor together with his employer, 
Highway Pavers, Inc., for injuries sustained on the 
job. At the trial, Highway Pavers, Inc., claimed that 
Allan Axt was not their employee but was, in fact, 
doing work for the subcontractor employer of Skornia 
at the time of the accident. The trial judge denied the 
motion of Highway Pavers, Inc., to examine their co-
defendant, Allan Axt, as an adverse party and to 
examine an employee of plaintiff's workman's compen-
sation carrier (who was not a party) as an adverse 
witness. 
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The rule of this case is simply this: As to the 
plaintiff' s workman's compensation carrier, a person, 
though not a party to the action, nevertheless may be 
called as an adverse witness by a defendant upon the 
showing that the witness has a financial interest in the 
outcome of plaintiff's case and an equal voice with 
plaintiff in the prosecution of the case; and, as between 
two co-defendants, wherein one of them seeks at the 
trial to call the other as an adverse witness, he may 
do so upon a showing that the financial interest of the 
co-defendant is adverse to the party calling him, and 
that the pleadings demonstrate that the witness claims 
opposite to the party seeking to call him on the issue 
upon which the examination is to be conducted. This 
case in no way suggests that where a person is called 
as an adverse witness by a party on the opposite side 
of the lawsuit, the court can or ought to refuse to let 
his deposition be introduced on the theory that his 
interest may be adverse to a co-defendant in the action. 
Again, in citing the opinion of Bauman v. Wood-
field, 224 Md. 207, 223 A. 2d 364, Appellant seeks to 
reach a different result than did the court by quoting 
language of the opinion out of context. That case in-
volved a Maryland statute similar to the Utah Rule 
allowing the use of the deposition of an adverse party 
for any purpose at the trial. Plaintiff appealed, claiming 
the trial court erroneously allowed defendant to read 
into evidence portions of plaintiff's pretrial deposition 
but had refused to let plaintiff read the balance of the 
deposition so as to complete the context. After the 
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reading of the deposition, the court had allowed the 
deponent plaintiff to testify extensively on the issues 
covered by the deposition. After the language quoted 
by Appellant's brief, the court emphasized that the 
parties were in fact on opposite sides of the lawsuit, 
being plaintiff and defendant respectively, and ruled 
that the deposition of such an adverse party couid be 
read at the trial, notwithstanding that the witness had 
already testified in the course of the trial. The court 
ruled that the words "any purpose" as used in the 
statute do not mean that the use of the deposition is 
limited to purposes of impeachment or contradiction, 
but rather that the party may introduce the deposition 
of his adversary as part of his substantive proof. The 
ruling of that case is opposite to appellant's thesis and 
nothing in the decision can in any way appropriately 
be read to infer that when a plaintiff seeks a judgment 
against a defendant and offers defendant's deposition 
into evidence, the trial court should exclude the depo-
sition testimony unless the defendant is opposite to 
plaintiff in every issue of the pleadings. 
Appellant's representation that Skok v. Glendale, 
3 Ariz. App. 252, 413 P . 2d 585, supports his theory 
is also unfounded. In that action, the city of Glen-
dale, Arizona, brought suit against co-tenants of certain 
real property for the costs of extension of sewer lines 
and services to their real property. The case arose from 
facts in which the city claimed that one William Bar-
clay, one of the owners of the land, entered into a 
contract with the city on behalf of himself and the other 
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co-tenants obligating them all to pay for installation 
of the sewer lines. The other co-tenant defendants 
claimed Barclay had no authority to bind them by his 
contract. Although Barclay had been among the original 
defendants when the action commenced, by the time 
of trial he had received a discharge in bankruptcy as 
to the liability in question. The trial court, applying 
a rule the same as our own, allowed the city to read 
the deposition of Barclay into evidence on the theory 
it was the deposition of an adverse party. The Arizona 
Supreme Court ruled the trial court committed error 
in allowing the deposition to be read into evidence 
because at the time of trial Barclay was no longer a 
"party" to the action and had no interest adverse to 
the city by reason of his discharge in bankruptcy. 
Regardless of how Appellant would like to stretch 
the language of the opinion to say more than was decided 
by the court, that case simply stands for the proposition 
that a deponent, who was formerly a defendant in the 
action but is no longer a party at the time of trial and 
has no interst adverse to the plaintiff and whose depo-
sition is offered into evidence, is not an adverse party 
under Rule 32(a) (2). 
In order to persuade this court that even though 
the deposition of one adverse defendant may be admis-
sable against himself, it should not be admissable 
against his co-defendant, Appellant relies heavily upon 
language found in two Michigan decisions. He quotes 
from the opinion in Ghezzi v. Holly (1970), 22 Michi-
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gan App. 157, 177 N.W. 2d 247, which in turn quotes 
from Genesee Merchants Bank and Trust Company 
v. Payne (1967), 6 Mich. App. 204, 148 N.W. 2d 503. 
The Ghezzi case is clearly distinguishable from the case 
before the court and the Genesee Merchants bank deci-
sion conforms to what was done by the trial court in this 
action. The Ghezzi case involved a claim of malpractice. 
The patient, Ghezzi, claimed Holly, a radiologist, 
failed to notify him or his treating doctor that x-rays 
showed a broken arm and so it was not immobilized 
and he continued to use it extensively. Traumatic 
arthritis developed. Ghezzi claimed Holly's failure to 
communicate the x-ray results was the cause. The depo-
sition of the treating physician, Dr. Mulder, was taken 
in which in response to a hypothetical question, he testi-
fied it was his opinion that failure to immobilize a 
non-displaced fracture could cause traumatic arthritis. 
Although at the time of taking his deposition Dr. 
Mulder was not a party to the action, he was thereafter 
joined as a co-defendant because Holly claimed that 
the x-ray results had been timely communicated to Dr. 
Mulder's office. Plaintiff sought and received permis-
sion to join Dr. Mulder, alleging that if he had received 
the results of the x-ray examination, then he was negli-
gent in failing to treat the condition. At the trial 
plaintiff sought to introduce Mulder's deposition as 
expert opinion evidence against Holly on the question 
of causation. That deposition contained the only testi-
mony offered at the trial to substantiate the alleged 
connection between a failure to immobilize plaintiff's 
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arm and the arthritic condition subsequently found to 
exist. After being joined as a defendant, Dr. Mulder 
had, by his answer, and at the trial, denied any relation-
ship between the alleged malpractice and the arthritic 
condition. The deposition statement therefore consti-
tuted an admission by Dr. Mulder which was inconsist-
ent with his position at trial. 
The case is not controlling in our instant situation 
not only because Dr. Mulder was not a party when 
his deposition was taken but also because, as the court 
noted in its opinion, the action really involved two law-
suits that were being tried together. The claimed 
negligence of Holly was entirely independent of the 
claim of negligence by Dr. Mulder and therefore the 
expert opinion evidence on the question of causation 
constituting an admission by Dr. Mulder would not, 
under the rules of evidence, be admissable as an admis-
sion against Holly. The appellate court noted that 
the plaintiff should not be permitted to discredit his 
opponent's claims merely by joining as a co-defendant 
any person from whom he could obtain a deposition 
statement contrary to the position of the original de-
fendant. There was no common interest as between 
the defendants, Holly and Mulder. They operated their 
businesses entirely independently. There was no claim 
of an agency between them and the liability of each 
of them would be independent of the question of liability 
of the other. The distinguishing difference seems to be 
the lack of common interest between Dr. Mulder and 
Holly to form the basis to allow the admission of one 
against the other. 
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As previously stated, Appellants reliance on the 
language contained in the Genesee Merchant's Bank 
and Trust Company v. Payne is not well founded, 
because the decision of that court supports what was 
done in this action by the trial court. The case involved 
a suit for injury consisting of a cut on the Achilles 
tendon of a child, Mary Ann Blaisdell, while on the 
premises of defendants, Carroll Payne and Margaret 
Payne. The plaintiff bank, acting as guardian for the 
minor child, brought the action on behalf of the child 
claiming that the child's parents had left the child in 
the care of Mr. and Mrs. Payne while they visited an-
other child in the hospital. In the course of the after-
noon, Mary Ann cut her Achilles tendon on some 
object in Paynes' yard. Sometime after the injury, 
a piece of glass (the top of a fruit jar) was discovered 
in the vicinity of the injury. From a jury verdict in 
favor of plaintiff, defendants appealed, asserting that 
it was error for the trial court to allow introduction of 
the discovery depositions of both defendants. After a 
discussion of the plaintiff's use of the depositions of 
both defendants as substantive proof in the action, the 
court ruled as follows: 
"Here, then, it was proper to admit the discovery 
deposition of defendants, Carroll Payne and 
Margaret Payne. These deponents were adverse 
parties and their statements are no less admis-
sable as depositions than if they had been made 
under any other circumstances." 
Again, Appellant's brief quotes language from 
Glenn Falls Insurance Co. vs. Weiss, 150 N.Y.S. 2d 
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685, 688 (1956), which he urges supports his theme. 
That ease involved a claim against five defendants, some 
corporate, some individuals, to set aside alleged f raudu-
dent conveyances of real estate. The court had before it a 
motion to compel the taking of depositions of two of 
the individual defendants who had previously failed 
to appear for examination, allowing their defaults to 
be entered. 
The language quoted by Appellant is simply 
dicta relating to what use might possibly be made of the 
depositions at an eventual trial. The legal question 
before the court was the issue of the sufficiency of the 
notice and the court ruled that: 
" . . . if a plaintiff desires to take the testimony 
of one defendant as a witness against a co-de-
fendant, the latter is 'entitled to plain notice to 
that effect,' and the notice to take the deposition 
of one defendant as a party is not sufficient." 
The ruling of the court goes to the sufficiency of the 
notice for the taking of the deposition and in no way 
relates to the issue before this court. 
Although the authorites cited by Appellant are 
not in point, there is one case that has squarely met 
the issues raised by Appellant. The decision was con-
trary to the position taken by the Appellant. In Sno-
white v. State (1966) 243 Md. 291, 221 A. 2d 342, the 
court dealt with a fact situation precisely on all fours 
with the matter presently before this court. The action 
involved a wrongful death claim brought by the widow 
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and surviving child of Walter W. Tennon, who had 
been killed in a traffic accident in a head-on collision 
with a gasoline truck owned by Harold Snowhite and 
driven by his employee-driver Clarence Henderson. 
The employer, Snowhite, who operated a bulk oil and 
gasoline business, claimed that he should not be held 
liable for the negligent acts of Henderson because 
Henderson had not taken the truck in the course of 
his employment. I t appears that after having completed 
some of his gasoline deliveries, Henderson had returned 
the truck to the place he normally parked it. He then 
went to a bar where he drank almost a pint of whisky, 
picked up a girl whom he then took in Snowhite's truck 
to a place nearby for some "sporting." The accident 
occurred when he was coming back to pick up a kero-
sene truck to make some other deliveries. During the 
trial the trial court permitted the reading of portions 
of Henderson's deposition as substantive evidence 
against Snowhite on the issue of negligent entrustment 
of the gasoline truck. The evidence related to Hender-
son being regularly allowed to use the trucks at his own 
pleasure and for his own purposes. The court set forth 
the issues to be decided as follows: 
"Snowhite earnestly contends that the admis-
sion of a portion of Henderson's deposition as 
substantive evidence against Snowhite on the 
issue of negligent entrustment was both erro-
neous and prejudicial. On the question of ad-
missibility, Snowhite's argument has three 
prongs: (a) that the trial court misconstrued 
Maryland Rule 413 which, when read in its 
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entirety, does not permit the use of a party's 
deposition when that party is present and avail-
able as a witness at the trial; (b) that although 
Henderson and Snowhite were joined as co-de-
fendants they did not share identity of interests 
and the deposition of Henderson could not be 
used against Snowhite on a separate and distinct 
issue in the absence of such identity of interest; 
and, (c) on the issue of negligent entrustment 
Henderson was not an adverse party to the plain-
tiffs and his deposition is controlled for use at 
the trial by Section (a) (3) of Maryland Rule 
413/' 
After quoting the Maryland Rule 413 which cor-
responds in all its applicable provisions with Utah Rule 
32, the court observed that because the Maryland Rule 
was so closely patterned after the Federal rule, the 
court should appropriately look to federal decisions for 
guidance. The court then goes on to rule as follows: 
" . . . The federal cases have indicated that the 
federal rule is to be interpreted literally and 
means just what it says, i.e., that the deposition 
of an adverse party may be used "for any pur-
pose." The deposition or relevant parts thereof 
of an adverse party may, therefore, be used as 
substantive evidence against other adverse parties 
even though that adverse party is present and 
available for giving testimony. Its use is not 
limited to impeachment of the testimony of the 
adverse party, although it may be used for that 
purpose too, if the adverse party testified. As 
stated by the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Ninth Circuit in Pursche v. Atlas Scrap-
per & Engineering Co., 300 F2d 467, 488 (9th 
Cir. 1962): 
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'Atlas had taken Pursche's testimony pursuant 
to Fed. Rules Civ. Proa, Rule 26, 28 U.S.C.A. 
in connection with its discovery and at the trial 
offered the depositions en masse as original 
evidence. But the court refused their admission. 
I t does not appear that the depositions were 
irregularly taken or that the court rejected 
them because they were lengthy and no doubt 
contained much that was repetitious, extraneous 
or otherwise inadmissible. Rather, it appears 
the court was of the opinion that since Pursche 
was present Atlas was required to call him as a 
witness and could not use his deposition to prove 
any fact or facts therein stated. This conclusion 
is manifest for in ruling, the court flatly said: 
'You are not entitled to have the depositions 
introduced if the witness is here except for im-
peaching purposes.' This was error. The use 
of depositions is regulated by Rule 26(d); sub-
section one permits 'any party' to use a depo-
sition to impeach the deponent as a witness, while 
subsection three permits 'any party' to use the 
deposition of any person as primary proof of 
the facts stated there provided the deponent is 
first shown to be unavailable as a witness; but 
subsection two permits 'an adverse party' to use 
the deposition of 'a party . . . for any purpose' 
and imposes no preliminary conditions to this 
use of the testimony. This is but a tacit way of 
saying that the deposition can be used as original 
evidence regardless of the presence or absence 
of the deponent. Pfotzer v. Aqua Systems, Inc., 
162 F . 2d 779 (2d Cir. 1947) ; Merchants Motor 
Freight, Inc. v. Downing, 227 F . 2d 247 (8th 
Cir. 1955); 4 Moore Fed. Prac. p. 1190.' 
"See also Riley v. Layton, 329 F 2d 53, 58 (10th 
Cir. 1964). 
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"In our opinion, the trial court correctly inter-
preted Maryland Rule 413(a) to permit the use 
of Henderson's deposition as substantive evi-
dence even though Henderson was in court and 
available as a witness. 
"Although it is true that parties are not neces-
sarily 'adverse' because they appear to be so by 
their alignment in the pleadings, it seems clear 
that the interest of the plaintiffs and Henderson 
was adverse and the plaintiffs were 'adverse 
parties' to Henderson within the meaning of 
the Maryland Rule 413. As such they had the 
right to introduce 'any part or all' of Hender-
son's deposition 'for any purpose.' There is no 
limitation upon the use of the adverse party's 
deposition other than that contained in Mary-
land Rule 413 (a) itself, i.e., that it may be used 
only 'so far as admissible under the rules of evi-
dence.' If Henderson had testified in person, 
the substance of his testimony in the deposition 
would have been admissible, and hence was ad-
missible by use of his deposition under Mary-
land Rule 413(a). The weight of the testimony 
as it might apply to a co-defendant with whom 
there was no identity of interest on one of the 
issues in the case would be for the jtiry." (pages 
352 and 353) 
The court in Snowhite v. State correctly applied 
the rule, as did the trial court in this action, and its 
reasoning should be followed by this court. 
In Reilly v. Layton (1964) 329 F . 2d 53, a tenth 
circuit court of appeals decision arising out of a medical 
malpractice claim, the court was called upon to apply 
Utah law in making a determination of whether or 
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not the defendant's treatment of plaintiff's fractured 
arm, which was ultimately amputated, in order to deter-
mine if expert testimony of a medical doctor met the 
necessary qualifications as an expert witness. In the 
course of the trial the judge had allowed plaintiff's 
counsel to read from the deposition of one appellant, 
Dr. Sanella, in cross-examining the other defendant, 
Dr. Reilly. The appellant urged on appeal that since 
the deposition had not been received into evidence, it 
was prejudicial error to allow the deposition to be used 
in cross examination in order to impeach Dr. Reilly. 
The respondent asserted that the deposition had not 
been used to impeach Dr. Reilly but rather that it was 
used to test Dr. Reilly's knowledge of the existence 
of the symptom of blueness in the patient's hand and 
impairment of blood circulation in the arm that was 
later amputated. In making its ruling on the issue, 
the court stated as follows: 
" . . . be that as it may, the deposition was that 
of a party to the action, and under the express 
terms of Rule 26 (d) (2), F.R. civ. P . 28 U.S. 
C.A., the deposition of a party ' . . . may be used 
by an adverse party for any purpose.' We find 
no error on this point." 
In applying the California rule which contains 
the same provisions as the Utah Rule, the Supreme 
Court of California held in Mayhood v. LaRosa, 24 
Cal Rptr. 837, 374 P . 2d 805, that the trial court 
had erred in preventing defendant from introducing 
into evidence plaintiff's deposition except for purposes 
of impeachment, and stated: 
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" . . . Section 2016 subdivision (d), paragraph 
(2), provides that, 'so far as admissible under 
the rules of evidence,7 any part or all of the 
deposition of a party 'may be used by an adverse 
party for any purpose/ Thus, insofar as plain-
tiff's deposition and answers to interrogatories 
contained admissions, they should have been ad-
mitted in evidence. (Dini v. Dini, 188 Cal. App. 
2d 506, 512 10 Cal. Rptr. 570, 574; Murry v. 
Manley, 170 Cal. App. 2d 364, 367, 338, P . 2d 
976, 978). As stated in the two cited cases, an 
adverse party's deposition 'may be used to estab-
lish any material fact, a prima facie case, or 
even to prove the whole case.' Consequently, a 
party is not limited to using an adverse party's 
deposition or answers to interrogatories for the 
purpose of impeaching his testimony." 
Wright and Miller, in their treatise, Federal Prac-
tice and Procedure, (1970) West Publishing, Vol 8, 
Section 2145, made it clear that the Federal Rule 32 
(a) (2) with which our rule corresponds has been 
consistently applied to allow the deposition of a party 
to freely be used by an adverse party literally for any 
purpose, and Merchants Motor Freight, Inc. v. Down-
ing, C.A. 8th, 1955, 227 F.2d 247, at page 250 makes 
it clear that this rule is broad and is to be liberally con-
strued. In Community Counseling Service, Incorpo-
rated v. Reilly, C.A. 4th, 1963, 317 F . 2d 239, at page 
243 the court stated in reference to this rule: 
" . . . I t has been consistently held that the Rule 
permits a party to introduce, as part of his sub-
stantive proof, the deposition of his adversary, 
and it is quite immaterial that the adversary 
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is available to testify at the trial or has testified 
there . . . " 
In 1969 the Sixth Circuit Court expressed approval 
of that same rule in an action for personal injuries by 
an injured customer and her husband against the 
owners of two stores, where the owners of the first 
store cross claimed against the second store in Pinga-
tore v. Montgomery Ward & Co. v. F . W. Woolworth 
Co., 419 F . 2d 1138. To that same effect, see Dexter 
v. United States, D.C. Miss 1969, 306 F . Supp. 415, 
425. In following the rule the Washington State Su-
preme Court stated: 
" . . . The rule has been interpreted by the Fed-
eral Courts to permit the deposition of a party 
to be used by an adverse party for any legal pur-
pose/' Young v. Liddington, 50 Wash. 2d 78, 
309 P . 2d 761. 
Appellant contends that the trial court should not 
have allowed the deposition testimony because it went 
to the question of the scope of the employment of Craig 
Kempton, and it would be no admission as against 
Givan Ford. In so contending Appellant seems to 
ignore the fact that Kempton was competent to testify 
on the scope of his authority. I t is a well settled rule 
that at the* trial this fact of agency can be proven by 
the testimony of the agent himself. That rule was 
affirmed in Johnson v. Associated Seed Growers, 240 
Wis. 278, 3 N.W. 2d 332, 324, 
" . . . although the declarations of an agent 
made to third persons, who are called to prove 
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them, are, in general, no evidence of the exist-
ence of an agency, the authority of an agent, 
when not in writing or so required to be, may 
be proven by testimony given on the trial by the 
agent himself." 
The court, in Montgomery Production Cred. Assn. 
v. Hohenburg & Co., 12 So. 2d 865, at 867 stated: 
"Agency may be proved by the testimony of the 
agent in the case in which the question of agency 
arises." 
And the California Court said in Boone v. Hall, 100 
Cal. App. 2d 738, 224 P. 2d 881, 883: 
"The fact of agency where it rests on parol may 
be established at the trial by the testimony of 
the agent himself." 
See also, 3 American Jurisprudence 2nd, Agency, Sec-
tion 354, Testimony of Agent. 
As shown above, the trial court did not commit 
reversible error in admission of evidence. 
P O I N T I I 
T H E J U R Y VERDICT WAS A M P L Y SUP-
PORTED BY T H E E V I D E N C E AS S H O W N 
BY T H E RECORD. 
In spite of Appellant's urging that the liability 
of Givan Ford Sales, Inc., was not clearly shown, the 
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record clearly demonstrates that Craig D. Kemp ton was 
acting well within the scope of his employment at the 
time of the accident. Respondent has referred exten-
sively to the applicable facts in the record, both in the 
statement of facts and the sixteen different items of 
evidence enumerated under Point I above. That itemi-
zation was set forth in response to appellant's claim 
that the only evidence of the liability of appellant came 
out of the brief amount of testimony from the deposi-
tion, which was read to the witness and the jury. Re-
spondent has also set forth in verbatim the total amount 
of testimony that was read from the deposition. 
As this court stated in Douglas v. Duvall, 5 Utah 
2d 429, 304 P . 2d 373, after a jury trial this court is 
not bound to accept Appellant's statement in its brief 
of the facts most favorable to itself. In fact, on appeal 
from a jury verdict, all evidence and inferences the 
jury could reasonably draw therefrom are reviewed 
in the light most favorable to the sustaining of the 
verdict. Wardell v. Jarmon, 18 Utah 2d 359, 423 P . 
2d 485; Howe v. Jackson, 18 Utah 2d 269, 421 P. 2d 
159. This court will assume the jury believed the evi-
dence which supported their verdict. Hindmarsh v. 
O. P. Skaggs Foodliner, 21 Utah 2d 413, 446 P . 2d 
410. 
I t is startling to have Appellant urge that a careful 
examination of the record will reveal no substantial 
evidence upon which the jury could have made a finding 
of liability against Givan Ford Sales, Inc. I t is inter-
esting to note that Appellant introduced no evidence 
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at the trial that Craig Kempton had ever been instructed 
that he was not to take cars from the lot to warm them 
up to check the antifreeze. The record is clear that he 
was required to drain the radiators in the street where 
it would drain into the gutter, and that he usually 
drove them a few blocks to warm them up. It is also 
clear that when he was hired, Ernie Earl told him to 
"keep them running/' which he understood to include 
frequent driving of the vehicles to inform his employer 
of any problems relative to how they ran or their sales 
condition. Furthermore, Appellant introduced no evi-
dence to the efFect that Mr. Kempton was ever told 
that he should not have driven the particular car in-
volved in the accident, or that any supervisor at any 
time, even after the accident, expressed any objection 
to his having taken the car to that intersection. 
Ernie Earl testified that when he hired Craig and 
gave him instructions as to his duties, he told Craig, 
among other things, that he was to keep the cars run-
ning (Tr. 219), and that after two or three days he 
would be on his own without someone showing him 
what to do (Tr. 222). The record is clear that Mr. 
Kempton was free to drive the cars on and off the lot 
throughout the day, as he serviced them, moved them 
about, warmed them up, and otherwise checked them to 
keep them in sales condition. His driving the Sunbeam 
Alpine to that intersection, three blocks away from the 
lot the morning of the accident in order to warm it 
up to check the antifreeze was consistent with his usual 
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praotice when checking antifreeze, and was cltearly 
within the scope and course of his employment. 
Appellant quotes from Saltas v. Affleck, 99 Utah 
65, 102 P . 2d 493 (1940), asserting it is practically 
indistinguishable on its facts from the present case. 
Such an assertion is clearly erroneous. In that case 
plaintiiF attempted to rely on a presumption derived 
from evidence that the employer was the owner of the 
truck which displayed his name as the only basis for 
his argument that the judge should have submitted the 
question of agency to the jury for its determination. 
The action involved a collision by a grocery delivery 
truck driven by an employee of the defendant. The 
employee regularly made six delivery trips a day fol-
lowing a route prepared by the manager on each trip. 
On the day in question, he had made his deliveries and 
was to return to the store, but he gave two girls a ride 
well beyond the employer's store and ten blocks away 
from his route. He had instructions that he should not 
take passengers without permission. There was no pas-
senger seat in the truck, and the girls sat on an empty 
packing box. The trial court decided that the driver 
was acting outside the scope of his employment "on a 
frolic of his own," as a matter of law, and directed the 
jury to return a verdict of no cause of action against 
the employer. As stated by the Supreme Court: 
"The question involved in this appeal is whether 
the presumption that the agent was acting 
within the scope of his employment arising from 
proof of ownership of the car and agency, and 
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the affirmative evidence rebutting this presump-
tion, raise a question of law for the court to de-
cide, or a question of fact to be submitted to the 
jury." (page 68) 
As noted by the court, when plaintiff introduced no 
evidence in support of his theory that the employee 
acted within the scope of his employment other than 
the presumption of mere ownership of the automobile: 
" . . . the evidence offered in rebuttal of the 
presumption of the agency of the driver from 
proof of ownership may be so uncontradicted 
and conclusive as to entitle the court to say as 
a matter of law, that the presumption has been 
rebutted." (page 70) 
The court further stated: 
"In the present case plaintiff did not offer any 
evidence contradicting that offered by the de-
defndant to rebut the presumption. So the court 
properly did not submit the case to the jury." 
The Saltas case stands only for the proposition 
that where plaintiff relies on a presumption arising 
from proof of ownership of a car and agency, and 
presents no further evidence in support of his theory 
that the employee acted within the scope of his agency, 
affirmative evidence rebutting that presumption, if un-
contradicted, can be sufficient for the court to deter-
mine the question as a matter of law. 
The rule of the Saltas case is clearly not applicable 
in our instant case. Plaintiff, Coburn, did not rely 
exclusively upon a presumption arising out of owner-
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ship of the vehicle, but presented other extensive and 
substantial evidence showing Craig Kempton was acting 
within the scope of his authority. 
Finally, as stated by Justice MacDonaugh in 
Hall v. Blackham, 18 Utah 2d 164, 417 P . 2d 664: 
"Where the parties have been afforded a trial, a 
presumption arises that the judgment should 
not be disturbed unless the one attacking it 
meets the burden of showing error substantial 
and prejudicial in the sense that there is a rea-
sonable likelihood that the result would have been 
different in the absence of such error." (page 
167) 
CONCLUSION 
The jury verdict in this case was appropriate. The 
facts and evidence support the judgment and counsel 
for plaintiff respectfully submits that the defendant 
has failed to show any prejudicial error or any reason-
able likelihood that the result would be different if 
defendant were awarded a new trial. 
Respectfully submitted, 
A. D E A N J E F F S of J E F F S A N D J E F F S 
Attorney for Plaintiff and Respondent 
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